Redemptions, Tithes, and Firstborns on Bekhorot 32

How Tosafot resolves foundational questions regarding dedications, valuation after slaughter, and who may partake of a blemished firstborn animal.

The Rules of Sanctified Animals

The Torah establishes different degrees of sanctity for various consecrated animals. A בכור (firstborn male animal offering) may not be redeemed, yet the priest is allowed to sell its meat. In contrast, a מעשר (animal tithe offering) may neither be redeemed nor sold under any circumstances. The Gemara links מעשר to חרמים (dedications to the Temple or priests) through a גזירה שוה (verbal analogy) using the phrase "it shall not be redeemed" to establish this restriction against selling.

Deriving Dedications: Strictness or Context

To validate this analogy, the Gemara tests whether the prohibition of redemption for חרמים is superfluous. The Gemara suggests that without an explicit verse, one would derive from מעשר that חרמים cannot be redeemed. Tosafot asks why the Gemara assumes we would compare חרמים to מעשר rather than to standard הקדש (consecrated property), which can be redeemed.

Tosafot provides two solutions to this dilemma. First, when faced with two competing analogies, the Sages derive toward the stricter ruling. Alternatively, because the Torah already explicitly states that חרמים cannot be sold, the Sages naturally align redemption with that existing negative rule.

וא"ת דילמא הוה ילפינן מהקדש דתפדה וי"ל דלחומרא ילפינן א"נ משום דבחרמים כתיב לא ימכר ומוקמינן בהו לא יגאל

And if you say: perhaps we would have derived it from general consecration, which can be redeemed? One can answer that we derive toward stringency. Alternatively, because regarding dedications it is written 'it shall not be sold,' we establish alongside it 'it shall not be redeemed.' (Tosafot on Bekhorot 32a:10:1)

Valuation and the Convulsing Animal

Rav Ashi reinterprets the phrase "it shall not be redeemed" in מעשר to mean that it cannot be sold. If the verse meant literal redemption, it would imply that redemption is prohibited during life but permitted after slaughter. However, redemption requires העמדה והערכה (standing and valuation before a priest), which cannot occur after an animal has been slaughtered. Rashi explains that מעשר is completely excluded from redemption, so the verse forbids selling it alive.

Tosafot challenges Rav Ashi’s assumption about post-slaughter valuation. Why could valuation not take place while the animal is מפרכסת (convulsing after slaughter), given that a convulsing animal is regarded as alive for all legal matters? Tosafot answers that a convulsing animal might still effect תמורה (substitution) as a live animal, neutralizing the contrast. Alternatively, Rabbi Shimshon of Joinville explains that once halachic slaughter is complete, the animal is no longer considered alive for the purpose of standing and valuation.

תימה לוקמה במפרכסת דהרי היא כחיה לכל דבריה כדאמר בפ"ב דחולין

This is astonishing! Let us establish it in a case where it is convulsing, which is regarded as alive for all matters, as it says in the second chapter of Chullin. (Tosafot on Bekhorot 32b:3:1)

Partaking of a Blemished Firstborn

The Mishnah permits a blemished בכור to be consumed even by a non-priest and a gentile. The Gemara identifies this ruling as Rabbi Akiva's understanding of Beit Hillel. However, in a separate baraita, Beit Hillel permit it only to non-priest Israelites, while the Sages forbid feeding it to gentiles.

Tosafot examines which source establishes the authoritative halacha. The Ri rules that a blemished בכור is permitted even to gentiles. He bases this on the standard halachic principle that an anonymous Mishnah outweighs a disputed baraita. Furthermore, our Mishnah formulated Rabbi Akiva’s view as an anonymous rule using the baraita's phrasing, giving it decisive authority.

ואומר ר"י דהלכתא כב"ה דמתניתין דשרו אפי' לעובד כוכבים ולא כב"ה דברייתא דאסרי ופליגי אר' עקיבא דהוי סתם במתני' ומחלוקת בברייתא דהוי הלכתא כסתם דמתני'

And the Ri says that the halakhah follows Beit Hillel of our Mishnah, who permit even to a gentile, and not like Beit Hillel of the baraita, who forbid and argue with Rabbi Akiva. For this is an anonymous ruling in the Mishnah versus a dispute in a baraita, and the halakhah follows an anonymous Mishnah. (Tosafot on Bekhorot 32b:10:1)

An anonymous Mishnah establishes the binding halacha over a disputed baraita, while textual stringency and physical status govern dedications and valuation.

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