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Halachot · Bekhorot 49 · בכורות מ״ט
Powers of Attorney, Mixed Births, and Day Thirty
How the Talmud defines power of attorney for movable goods, resolves doubtful firstborn obligations, and rules on infants dying on their thirtieth day.
Authorizing Litigation for Movable Property
In Bekhorot 48b–49a, two fathers gave redemption money to a single kohen for two babies who intermingled, and one infant died. If one father grants a power of attorney (הרשאה - harsha'ah) to the other, the emissary can recover the money on behalf of both.
The Gemara asks how an authorization may be issued for money. The sages of Neharde'a taught that authorization is not written for movable items (מטלטלין - metaltelin). The Gemara clarifies that this limitation applies only when the possessor already denied the claim. Because the kohen admits receiving the funds, the authorization is valid.
The Rambam codifies this rule in his legal code. A plaintiff cannot write an authorization for movable property or money if the defendant has already denied it. Doing so would appear fraudulent, as the principal attempts to assign an asset the other party denies possessing.
Maran rules in the Shulchan Arukh that by Talmudic law, one may not write an authorization for denied movables. However, the Rema notes that prevailing practice follows later rabbinic authorities: the custom is to authorize litigation even if the defendant completely denied the debt or deposit.
הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּכַפְרֵיהּ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלָא כַּפְרֵיהּ — כָּתְבִינַן.This applies only where he denied the claim, but where he did not deny the claim, we write an authorization. (Bekhorot 49a:2)
Compound Doubts in Mixed Births
The Gemara addresses two women married to two different men who gave birth together to two boys and a girl. One woman had given birth previously, while the other was primiparous. The babies became intermingled, leaving each newborn's maternal origin unknown. Rav Huna taught that in this case, the kohen receives nothing. Each father can assert that his own wife bore the female child, or that the female was born first.
The Rambam rules contrary to Rav Huna's simple reading. The husband whose wife had not given birth previously must pay five selaim. In his view, freeing the father requires two distant doubts, and such remote probability does not exempt him. The Tur strongly questions this ruling, maintaining that since it remains a safek (ספק - doubt), monetary possession cannot be displaced.
Maran the Shulchan Arukh rules against the Rambam: if the births yielded two males and one female among two men, the kohen receives nothing. The Rema records no dispute, cementing the exemption based on the standard rule that the claimant carries the burden of proof.
זכר ונקבה או שני זכרים ונקבה אין כאן לכהן כלום:A male and a female, or two males and a female, the kohen receives nothing here. (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 305:31)
Redemption and Mourning on Day Thirty
The Mishnah examines the exact point at which the mitzva (מצוה - commandment) of pidyon haben (פדיון הבן - redemption of the firstborn son) takes effect. The Rabbis hold that if a firstborn dies on the thirtieth day of life, this day is treated like the preceding day. The obligation to redeem arises only once the thirtieth day has passed.
The Tur codifies that if a baby dies on the thirtieth day, the father is exempt. Any money already handed over must be returned by the kohen. A firstborn child does not become subject to redemption until thirty full days elapse.
The Gemara extends this temporal principle to the laws of mourning: Rav Ashi states that all agree the thirtieth day is like the day before. As the Shach explains, Maran rules that if an infant dies on the thirtieth day, no mourning is observed. This follows the general rule that the halakha is lenient in all mourning disputes. (The Rambam's specific text on this mourning ruling is not supplied in this selection.)
Redemption obligations take effect only after thirty complete days of life, while prevailing practice allows powers of attorney even when the defendant denies the claim.